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Where Do We Go from Here? 
April 30, 2008 in Tales from Taiwan by The China Beat | 2 comments 
With just three weeks until president-elect Ma Ying-jeou’s inauguration, many Taiwanese and 
their friends and relatives abroad are experiencing a sense of optimism, perhaps best expressed in 
the frequent utterances of the phrasemashang jiuhao 馬上就好, which can mean either 
“Everything will ready right away” or “Things will get better as soon as Ma takes power”. At the 
same time, however, there is also a growing sense of trepidation about some of the challenges 
facing the in-coming Ma administration: 
1. To begin with, much of Taiwan’s non-Mainlander population has yet to be convinced that the 
new administration will be sensitive to their needs. For example, when the first round of cabinet 
appointments was announced, more than a few eyebrows were raised about the sizeable 
percentage of Mainlanders in the cabinet (as of this posting, approximately 25% of the new 
cabinet appointees were Mainlanders, who make up about 15% of Taiwan’s total population). 
Others voiced dismay that southern Taiwanese elites like Chan Chi-hsien 詹啟賢, who worked 
hard to get out the vote for the Ma campaign, ended up being passed over for key positions. 
While the latest round of appointments has proven somewhat less controversial (at least in terms 
of sub-ethnic politics, but see #2 and #3 below), people will still be watching to see how things 
develop. 
A related and perhaps even thornier issue is that of transitional justice (轉型正義), and in 
particular what to do about the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall (國立中正紀念堂), which 
President Chen Shui-bian’s administration attempted to rename as the National Taiwan 
Democracy Memorial Hall (國立台灣民主紀念館), only to have its efforts blocked by the 
Legislative Yuan. A similar problem surrounds the Cihhu Presidential Burial Palace (慈湖陵寢), 
to which Ma paid an emotional visit shortly after his election (see previous blogposts for 
discussions of these two sites). Concerns have also been expressed by the appointment of Wang 
Ching-feng 王清峰, former convener of the March 19 Shooting Truth Investigation Special 
Committee (三一九槍擊事件真相調查特別委員會), to the position of Minister of Justice. 
2. A second challenge involves the merits of bringing back officials from previous KMT 
administrations, which has given rise to a sense of “meet the new boss, same as the old boss” 
(from The Who’s rock classic “Won’t Get Fooled Again”). One Chinese expression currently 
being used to describe the situation is “old wine in new bottles” (老酒裝新瓶), although some 
wags prefer “old wine in old bottles” (老酒裝老瓶). While administrative experience can be 
most valuable, questions have been raised about when the younger generation will get its chance. 
There is also a pressing need to avoid returning to the corrupt politics of previous decades of 
one-party rule, especially since the overwhelming KMT majority in the Legislative Yuan bodes 
ill for the prospect of checks and balances. After years of voiciferous complaints about 
corruption during Chen Shui-bian’s presidency, it would be particulalry ironic if this spectre 
were to haunt his successor. 
Another disturbing harbinger is a proposal put forth by the Soochow University (東吳大學) 
administration to restrict faculty participation in political talk shows. Although this proposal 
failed to pass the faculty senate, one professor is said to have withdrawn from a pro-green talk 
show due to pressure from the university authorities, including the Board of Directors. The 
current President of Soochow University is none other than Premier-designate Liu Chao-shiuan 
劉兆玄, another former KMT official who has served as Minister of Transportation (1993) and 
Vice-Premier (1997). 
3. Achieving a suitable framework for talks with China constitutes the third challenge. In the 
short term, establishing direct links and allowing Chinese tourists into Taiwan should not be too 
difficult to achieve, especially since the PRC seems highly willing to display its magnanimity in 
light of the Tibet fiasco. Things will get tougher as soon as issues of sovereignty are raised, 
however, as the Ma administration will have to convince the people, and especially the 42% of 
voters (over 5.4 million people) who supported the DPP, that it will not “sell out” to China. The 
utility of the so-called “1992 Consensus” (九二共識) in future negotiations also remains to be 
seen, while the appointment of “deep green” former Taiwan Solidarity Union (台聯) legislator 
Lai Hsin-yuan 賴幸媛 as chairperson of the Mainland Affairs Council (陸委會) has succeeded 
in offending many KMT members, some of whom are striving to assert their own authority over 
future negotiations. And, as if the situation wasn’t complex enough, the Ma administration will 
have to balance its desire for improved cross-Straits relations with the strategic needs of Japan 
and especially the United States, which will welcome exit of “troublemaker” Chen but may be 
wary of Taiwan’s becoming too cozy with China. (See also the analysis by Ting Yu-chou 丁渝
洲, a former head of the National Security Bureau (國家安全局) during KMT rule) 
4. Finally, as noted in this blog’s most recent post, it is still the economy (stupid). Closer links to 
China will come just as many Taiwanese and Western businesses are starting to abandon the 
Middle Kingdom in favor of shifting operations to India and the newly developing economies of 
Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and even Burma). More importantly, prices of 
essential commodities have yet to rise to free market levels, having been frozen during the recent 
election season. The Ma administration hopes to resolve this issue with one huge hike, which can 
then be blamed (with some credibility) on the out-going Chen administration. If prices continue 
their upward trend, however, Ma may end up like George Bush did in 1992. Ma has already 
expressed his concerns about his administration’s ability to fulfill its campaign promises 
regarding the economy during a speech to the American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei on 
April 29. 
Increased Chinese tourism and investment in the housing market may help cushion any 
economic shocks, but questions remains as to who will really benefit from such growth. Most 
people tend to forget that those who profited from the stratospheric stock and housing prices of 
the mid-1980s were not ordinary citizens but wealthy speculators, many of whom had ties to the 
KMT. One wonders what they might be thinking now… 
 
